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RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT: THE 1972 AMENDMENT-A
PERSPECTIVE
I. Introduction
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Act)'
which proscribed discrimination on the basis of race, religion, na-
tional origin, color, or sex.2 Most of the litigation under the Act has
involved allegations of racial or sex discrimination.3 However,
according to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), there has been a steady increase in the number of com-
plaints4 of religious discrimination.'
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to e-17 (Supp. , 1972)).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act contains provisions designed to
ensure equal employment opportunity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as
amended, (Supp. II, 1972) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
3. See generally Carey, Litigation Involving Sex Discrimination Under
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 60 WOMEN LAWS. J. 21 (1974);
Ewald, Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964-A Ten-Year Perspective, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 101 (1974); Note, Title
VII and Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 1614 (1973); Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Pref-
erences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. REV. 463 (1973).
4. The Commission reported handling 87 complaints involving reli-
gious discrimination in its first year of operation. 1 EEOC ANN. REP. 58
(1967). During the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1972, 1,176 such com-
plaints were brought before the Commission; 573 of these were recom-
mended for investigation. 7 EEOC ANN. REP. 38, 43 (1973).
5. The procedure for an action before the EEOC is set out in section
706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
If a person believes that he has been discriminated against he may file a
charge with the EEOC alleging that an employer, employment agency, or
labor union has engaged in an unlawful employment practice. The Com-
mission will inform the respondent of the action and make an investigation
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The language of the original Act was very broad in regard to
religious discrimination.' The legislation did not define religion nor
did it establish any guidelines as to what constituted religious dis-
crimination.7 Entrusted with implementation of the Act, the EEOC
issued guidelines' designed to clarify the meaning of the statutory
prohibition against such discrimination. These guidelines, however,
did not have the force of a congressional mandate and their validity
was questioned.' In 1972, Congress acted to eliminate this uncer-
tainty by amending the Civil Rights Act. " The amendment defined
the term "religion" to include "belief" as well as practices and
actions based upon the belief; it requires reasonable accommoda-
tion to the employee's religious needs unless the employer can show
that an undue hardship is thereby imposed on his business." This
Comment will evaluate the effect of the 1972 amendment and deter-
of the facts surrounding the alleged discriminatory practice. If the Com-
mission determines that the charge is true it will endeavor to alleviate the
unlawful practices through conferences, conciliation, and persuasion.
Under the 1964 law as originally enacted, if conciliation failed, the peti-
tioner could bring a civil action. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1970), as amended, (Supp. , 1972)). The 1972 amendment gives the
Commission the power to bring a suit in its own name, thereby relieving
the petitioner of having to pay for the suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp.
11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). Dismissal of the charge by
the Commission, or failure of the Commission to bring an action in court
does not prevent the petitioner from instituting an action under section
2000e-5. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to e-17 (Supp. 11, 1972).
8. See notes 42-43 infra.
9. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
10. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j) (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C.. § 2000e (1970) provides:
"The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and prac-
tice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer's business."
11. Id.
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mine whether it has resulted in clarification of the law governing
religious discrimination. The analysis will focus on three key terms
in the amendment: religion, reasonable accommodation, and undue
hardship. A final section will consider the problem of employees
whose religious beliefs preclude their membership in labor unions.
II. Defining "Religion"
Although the Civil Rights Act prohibited religious discrimination,
it failed to define "religion."'" The courts never determined the
meaning of that term intended under the Civil Rights Act."3 The
Supreme Court, however, had developed a working definition of
"religion" in cases arising under the Selective Service Act, 4 and this
definition was eventually adopted by the EEOC in religious dis-
crimination cases.' 5
In United States v. Seeger,6 for instance, the Court described a
test to determine qualification for the conscientious objector exemp-
tion of the Selective Service Act. Under that act persons who were
opposed to war "by reason of religious training and belief" were
exempt from military service. 7 The Court held that a "sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for
the exemption comes within the statutory definition."'" Seeger im-
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
13. See Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of
Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REv. 599, 614-19 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Edwards & Kaplan].
14. 50 U.S.C. § 451-71 (App. 1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 451-71a
(App. Supp. II, 1972).
15. EEOC Dec. No. 71-779, summarized at 3 F.E.P. Cas. 172 (Dec. 21,
1970).
16. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
17. 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (App. 1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). Under
the Selective Service Act of 1948 religious training and belief was meant
to be "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation . . . ." Selective
Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612-13. This provision was
deleted by Congress in 1967. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub.
L. No. 90-40, § 6(j), 81 Stat. 100, 104 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (App.
1970), as amended, (Supp. , 1972).
18. 380 U.S. at 176.
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plied that the claimant's belief had to be religious. In a later case,
Welsh v. United States,'" the Court broadened its view to include
moral, or ethical belief.2 ° Welsh requires that the claimed belief
"play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the regis-
trant's life." 2' The Court recognized that religious beliefs are in-
tensely personal, and that "'[religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.' "2 If the
claimed belief is not connected with any moral, ethical, or religious
tenet, it will not fall within the definition. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the Court's analysis in Welsh: if the belief "rests solely
upon the consideration of policy, pragmatism, or expediency," it
does not fall within the exemption.23 However, once a determination
is made that the claimed belief is based upon moral, ethical, or
religious grounds, other considerations or philosophies found to be
"merely personal" are not relevant. 4
The EEOC adopted the definition of religion articulated in the
Selective Service cases in 1970 when it decided a case involving an
employee of a hospital who had been discharged because of her
refusal to abide by dress regulations set by her employer. 5 She
contended that her religion required her to wear a head covering at
all times. Although she regarded her religion as "Old Catholic," the
EEOC found no evidence that she was a member of "an organized
19. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
20. Id. at 340.
21. Id. at 339.
22. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944), cited in United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (citations omitted). In Welsh the
registrant refused to classify his beliefs as religious yet the Court still found
the beliefs to be based upon moral and ethical tenets held with the sincer-
ity of traditional religious beliefs. 398 U.S. at 340. In Seeger the Court
stated that the truth of a belief was not to be questioned. 380 U.S. at 185.
Later in that opinion, however, the Court indeed examined Seeger's beliefs
to determine whether they were based upon political or other ephemeral
philosophies which would be considered "merely personal," or "religious"
ideals which would therefore fall under the coverage of the Selective Serv-
ice Act. Id. at 186.
23. 398 U.S. at 342-43.
24. Id. at 343.
25. EEOC Dec. No. 71-779, summarized at 3 F.E.P. Cas. 172 (Dec. 21,
1970).
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sect whose beliefs are common to a number of people."26 Yet the
EEOC found the belief to fall within the coverage of the Act because
her conviction was "'held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions.' "27 It was essentially the Seeger-Welsh test that was
applied to ascertain whether the belief came within the protection
of the Act. The case before the EEOC involved not merely a belief,
but actions and practices flowing from that belief.
When the Act was amended in 1972, the term "religion" was said
to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief ... . There is little legislative history relating to the
amendment, but the intent of Congress was clearly expressed during
debate in the Senate:
The term "religion" as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, encompasses
. . . the same concepts as are included in the first amendment-not merely
belief, but also conduct; the freedom to believe, and also the freedom to act.
• . . [Tihe Civil Rights Act . . . [was] thus intended to protect the same
rights in private employment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State,
or local governments."
The 1972 amendment thus incorporates the Seeger-Welsh test into
the framework of the Act.
Considerable question exists over the necessary degree of sincer-
ity. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co.3 ° presents a good example. At the
time Dewey was hired, his religious convictions did not prevent him
from working overtime on Sundays. He later converted to the Faith
Reformed Church, which considered it a sin to work on Sunday.
Five years later Dewey was required to work overtime on a Sunday,
and following the dictates of his faith, he refused. On the five Sun-
days that he was scheduled to work, he obtained a replacement. On
the sixth Sunday, he refused not only to work, but also to obtain a
26. Id. at 173.
27. Id. (footnote omitted).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1970).
29. 118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972) (remarks of Senator Randolph); see
Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D.
Vt. 1974) (citing with approval Senator Randolph's remarks).
30. 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 429
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971).
1975]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
replacement. He contended that his beliefs had evolved to the point
where obtaining a replacement would also violate the dictates of his
faith. Because of this refusal, the company terminated Dewey's
employment. Not questioning the abrupt change in Dewey's prac-
tice, the court apparently was satisfied as to the sincerity of his
belief.' Although this result has been criticized, 2 the Supreme
Court, in Welsh, supported the concept of an evolving belief.3 3 It is
only required that the belief be religious in the employee's own
moral, ethical, or religious conception at the time it is claimed, and
be held with the "'strength of more traditional religious convic-
tions.' -31
While it does not matter when the belief becomes firm, the belief
must be firm at the time it is raised.35 Thus, where an employee
merely stated that his conviction of strict Sunday Sabbath observ-
ance was reaffirmed when his son miraculously recovered from sur-
gery, without elaborating on the basis of that belief, a court held
that the plaintiff "failed to demonstrate the requisite sincerity of
religious convictions to make out a prima facie case."36
The crucial question in examining a particular person's belief is
not whether the belief is "religious," but whether it is "truly held." 7
Although this determination is a question of fact, differing opinions
have been expressed as to which party has the burden of proof.
According to one view, "the mere assertion of belief will serve as
31. 300 F. Supp. at 711.
32. It has been suggested that the court acted irrationally in finding the
religious belief sincere: "It is exasperating to ask how [the] replacement
of Dewey was religiously acceptable on August 14, 1966, but not so two
weeks later." Edwards & Kaplan 615. This analysis fails to recognize,
however, that religious training and personal reflection had led Dewey to
the sincere belief that arranging for a replacement to work on Sunday was
as sinful as if he were to work himself.
33. "At the time of registration for the draft, neither [conscientious
objector] had yet come to accept pacifist principles. Their views on war
developed only in subsequent years .... " 398 U.S. at 336.
34. Id. at 337 (citation omitted).
35. Hansard v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7560
(E.D. Tex. 1973).
36. Id. at 7562.
37. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
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prima facie evidence of its genuineness." 8 Thus, the burden falls
upon the employer: "Unless the employer can point to some pre-
vious specific and overt behavior that is patently inconsistent with
the individual's professed beliefs, it is questionable whether he can
successfully challenge the employee's sincerity."39 The contrary
view requires "that a finding of the sincerity of the asserted religious
conviction is necessary for plaintiff [employee] to make out a
prima facie case under the statute." °
The better view places the burden of proving sincerity of belief
upon the religious observer. Otherwise the employee could claim to
be a follower of any religion, and the employer would be forced to
determine his sincerity. An employee, so charged with the burden
of proof, could possibly prove his sincerity by introducing fellow
followers as witnesses."
III. Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
Two years after passage of the Civil Rights Act, the EEOC pro-
mulgated its first set of guidelines concerning religious discrimina-
tion.4" The guidelines were revised in 1967.11 This revision, and the
38. Edwards & Kaplan 614 (emphasis in original).
39. Id.
40. Hansard v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7560,
7561 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
41. Even though the employee who claimed to be a member of the "Old
Catholic" faith was the sole member of that faith it might not have been
difficult for her to meet the burden of proof by introducing friends who
could have testified as to the sincerity of her belief. See text accompanying
notes 25-27 supra.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1974) states: "Observation of the Sabbath and
other religious holidays. (a) Several complaints filed with the Commission
have raised the question whether it is discrimination on account of religion
to discharge or refuse to hire employees who regularly observe Friday eve-
ning and Saturday, or some other day of the week, as the Sabbath or who
observe certain special religious holidays during the year and, as a conse-
quence, do not work on such days. (b) The Commission believes that the
duty not to discriminate on religious grounds, required by section 703 (a)(1)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation on the part of the
employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of
employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be
made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's needed
1975]
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work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar
qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer. (c)
Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to
hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the em-
ployer has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the re-
quired accommodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasona-
ble. (d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in
an effort to seek an equitable application of these guidelines to the variety
of situations which arise due to the varied religious practices of the Ameri-
can people."
43. The guidelines were set out in 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966) as follows:
"Section 1605.1 Observances of Sabbath and religious holidays. (a) (1)
Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question
whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or to refuse
to hire a person whose religious observances require that he take time off
during the employer's regular work week. These complaints arise in a
variety of contexts, but typically involve employees who regularly observe
certain special holidays during the year. (2) The Commission believes that
the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds includes an obligation on
the part of the employer to accommodate the reasonable religious needs
of employees and, in some cases, prospective employees where such accom-
modation can be made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the
business. (3) However, the Commission believes that an employer is free
under Title VII to establish a normal work week (including paid holidays)
generally applicable to all employees, notwithstanding that this schedule
may not operate with uniformity in its effect upon the religious observ-
ances of his employees. For example, an employer who is closed for busi-
ness on Sunday does not discriminate merely because he requires that all
his employees be available for work on Saturday. Likewise, an employer
who closes his business on Christmas or Good Friday is not thereby obli-
gated to give time off with pay to Jewish employees for Rosh Hashanah or
Yom Kippur. (b) While the question of what accommodation by the em-
ployer may reasonably be required must be decided on the peculiar facts
of each case, the following guidelines may prove helpful: (1) An employer
may permit absences from work on religious holidays, with or without pay,
but must treat all religions with substantial uniformity in this respect.
However, the closing of a business on one religious holiday creates no
obligation to permit time off from work on another. (2) An employer, to
the extent he can do so without serious inconvenience to the conduct of
his business, should make a reasonable accommodation to the needs of his
employees and applicants for employment in connection with special reli-
gious holiday observances. (3) The employer may prescribe the normal
work week and foreseeable overtime requirements, and, absent an intent
on the part of the employer to discriminate on religious grounds, a job
applicant or employee who accepted the job knowing or having reason to
[Vol. III
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absence of interpretation or even sanction by the courts, created
problems in Dewey." There the district court applied the 1967
guidelines." It found that these guidelines set forth a two-fold test:
"(1) the employer must make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of its employees; (2) unless such accommodation will
cause undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."46
Applying that test, the court found that the employer violated the
Act by failing to reasonably accommodate the employee's religious
needs.47 Though the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
on the grounds that the 1967 guidelines were not in effect at the time
of the alleged discriminatory practices, 8 it held that even if the 1967
guidelines had been in effect, there was no discriminatory act since
the employer had made a reasonable accommodation.49 The court
of appeals cast doubt on the validity of the guidelines insofar as they
interfered with the "internal affairs of an employer, absent
discrimination . . . ."I The decision was affirmed without opinion
by an equally divided Supreme Court.' The EEOC and the courts
were thus left with no clear understanding of the application and
validity of the guidelines.
To relieve these doubts, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act
believe that such requirements would conflict with his religious obligations
is not entitled to demand any alterations in such requirements to accom-
modate his religious needs. (4) Where an employee has previously been
employed on a schedule which does not conflict with his religious obliga-
tions, and it becomes necessary to alter his work schedule, the employer
should attempt to achieve an accommodation so as to avoid a conflict.
However, an employer is not compelled to make such an accommodation
at the expense of serious inconvenience to the conduct of his business or
disproportionate allocation of unfavorable work assignments to other em-
ployees. "
44. 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 429
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971).
45. 300 F. Supp. at 712.
46. Id. at 714.
47. Id. at 714-15.
48. 429 F.2d 324, 329-30 (6th Cir. 1970).
49. Id. at 331.
50. Id. at 331 n.1.
51. 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
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to include within its statutory framework a definition of "religion"
in accord with the EEOC guidelines. 2 The amendment was con-
ceived as an express reaction to the court's decision in Dewey.53 The
test set out by the district court was given statutory support, and
must be the basis of any analysis of religious discrimination.5 4
A. Reasonable Accommodation
Before an employer can meet his burden of showing undue hard-
ship, he must prove he has made a reasonable accommodation to
the employee's religious needs. The court of appeals in Dewey
argued that such a test would require the employer to discriminate
against his other employees.5 This argument has not been accepted
by other courts or by the EEOC. This alleged discrimination against
other employees evolves into a conflict between first5 and four-
teenth amendment rights-between freedom of religion and equal
protection of the laws.57
52. See note 10 supra.
53. 118 CONG. REc. 7563 (1972): "The purpose . . . is to provide the
statutory basis for EEOC to formulate guidelines on discrimination be-
cause of religion such as those challenged in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co." Id. at 7564 (citation omitted).
54. Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Ore.
1973).
55. 429 F.2d at 330.
56. The Act bestows first amendment protection against private em-
ployment practices which result in religious disrimination. See text accom-
panying note 29 supra.
57. Although there has been no case that has squarely been faced with
a conflict between first amendment rights and fourteenth amendment
rights, the Supreme Court has held that first amendment rights have a
preferred position. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); see Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free practice of religion); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free practice of religion). But cf. Otten v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953), which on appeal from a
denial of a motion for preliminary injunction held that an individual is not
required by the first amendment to conform his conduct so as to accom-
modate another's religious necessities. Id. at 61. At the trial on the merits
the district court refused to issue an injunction, viewing the prior circuit
court opinion as dispositive of the federal question. Otten v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 132 F. Supp. 836, 838 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Otten v.
Staten Island Rapid Trans. Ry., 229 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 983 (1956).
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The EEOC contends that "to make reasonable accommodations
for the religious beliefs of particular employees does not discrimi-
nate against other employees whose religious beliefs do not require
accommodation."58 The EEOC requires the employer to document
his inability to accommodate. 9 Failure to do so may establish a
presumption that the employer could reasonably accommodate."
Various courts have supported the EEOC position. In Claybaugh
v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co.," the court held that "by
its very language [the 1967 guideline] places an affirmative duty
upon an employer to attempt an accommodation.""2 It stated that
because of the telephone company's size, "an open position could
be found within a short time where Claybaugh's religious needs
could be permanently accommodated. It is the employer's duty to
seek out such an open position within its organization before it can
discharge an employee based on religious needs. '6 3
At least one court has held that in the case of companies with
multiple divisions, the practices of all the divisions would be consid-
ered in determining whether an employer could make a reasonable
accommodation. In Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. , there was no
indication that an accommodation could be made within the divi-
sion for which the employee worked. The newspaper to which the
plaintiff applied was a six-day newspaper, and could not accommo-
date the employee, who could not work on Saturday. Evidence per-
taining to the employment practices of all divisions was held, how-
ever, to be relevant to the question of whether a reasonable accom-
modation could have been made by the defendant corporation.,' On
58. EEOC Dec. No. 71-463, summarized at 3 F.E.P. Cas. 385, 386
(Nov. 13, 1970).
59. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.1-.14 (1974). The EEOC requires businesses
of 100 employees or more to file yearly reports concerning their employ-
ment practices. Id. § 1602.7. Besides this requirement, all businesses must
preserve employment records for six months from the date of any personnel
action involving an employee. Id. § 1602.14.
60. See EEOC Dec. No. 72-1578, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4652 (Apr. 21,
1972); EEOC Dec. No. 70-670, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4242 (Mar. 30, 1970).
61. 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
62. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
63. Id. (footnote omitted).
64. 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972).
65. Id. at 351.
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remand the evidence showed that the other newspaper published by
the defendant was a seven-day newspaper and therefore was able to
accommodate those who had a Sabbath on a Saturday, by having
them work on Sunday.6
It is well established under the Act and the EEOC guidelines that
"[tihe burden is upon the employer to seek cooperation of other
employees, if necessary; and it is clear that the employer must show
that it in fact attempted an accommodation, if it is to carry its
burden of proof."67 According to the EEOC, the minimum require-
ment placed upon the employer is to inquire if other employees
would be willing to adjust their work schedules to accommodate
another's religious needs."8 Although the court of appeals in Dewey
found that reasonable accommodation was made when the em-
ployer allowed the employee to find a replacement,69 subsequent
decisions have adhered to the EEOC policy. 0 It is imperative, at the
very least, that the employer ask "that its employees exchange
shifts."7  Other types of accommodations have been suggested by
the courts and the EEOC.72
66. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684, 686 (W.D.
Tenn. 1973). But see Shaffield v. Northrup Worldwide Aircraft Servs.,
Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974), where a division was too small to
make an adequate accommodation.
67. Shaffield v. Northrup Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp.
937, 941-42 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (emphasis omitted).
68. EEOC Dec. No. 72-0606, summarized at 4 F.E.P. Cas. 311 (Dec.
22, 1971).
69. 429 F.2d at 331.
70. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972);
Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
71. Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Ore.
1973).
72. See Drum v. Ware, 7 F.E.P. Cas. 269 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (reasonable
accommodation had been made when the religious observer was shifted to
another post office located 25 miles from where he had been working);
Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973)
(reasonable accommodation can be made by finding an "open position" for
the religious observer); EEOC Dec. No. 72-2066, summarized at 4 F.E.P.
Cas. 1063 (June 22, 1972) (where there is substitution, the religious ob-
server can make up time by working shifts for his substitute); EEOC Dec.
No. 71-463, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4350 (Nov. 13, 1970) (if there is no
available substitute, the employer is required to train a person to cover);
[Vol. III
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Controversies also appear where there is voluntary overtime. To
insure an adequate work force over the weekend an employer 'may
require an employee choosing to work overtime during the weekend
to work both days.73 In one case, discrimination was alleged when
an employer allowed Saturday workers to be absent on Sunday
while not allowing a person unable to work on Saturday to work on
Sunday.74 The EEOC found that reasonable accommodation could
have been made by allowing the Saturday observer to be absent on
his day of religious observance.75
Although the Act speaks in terms of a reasonable accommodation
being made by the employer, it is not proper to assume that only a
unilateral obligation is imposed. Recent decisions indicate that the
employee must also be willing to make reasonable accommoda-
tions."6 In the first instance the employee must give his employer
reasonable notice for the employer to make necessary adjustments.77
EEOC Dec. No. 70-716, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4255 (Apr. 23, 1970) (where
there is no need of supervision or assistance, a reasonable accommodation
can be made by allowing the religious observer to compensate for time lost
by working different hours); EEOC Dec. No. 70-580, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec.
4214 (Mar. 2, 1970) (where work is normally done by one employee, it is
not unreasonable to have another trained in the operation so there can be
coverage).
73. EEOC Dec. No. 73-0314, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4711 (Aug. 31,
1972); EEOC Dec. No. 70-110, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4099 (Aug. 27, 1969).
74. EEOC Dec. No. 70-110, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4099 (Aug. 27,
1969); see EEOC Dec. No. 73-0314, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4711 (Aug. 31,
1972).
75. EEOC Dec. No. 70-110, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4099 (Aug. 27,
1969).
76. In numerous court cases and EEOC decisions decided against the
employer, it has been noted that the employee was always willing to ac-
commodate and in fact had suggested reasonable accommodations which
could have been adopted by the discriminating employer. See Drum v.
Ware, 7 F.E.P. Cas. 269 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell
Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973); Daniels v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel.
Co., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 1323 (D. Ore. 1972); EEOC Dec. No. 72-2066, summa-
rized at 4 F.E.P. Cas. 1063 (June 22, 1972); EEOC Dec. No. 70-716, 1973
CCH EEOC Dec. 4255 (Apr. 23, 1970).
77. EEOC Dec. No. 72-1579, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4654 (Apr. 21,
1972). There, the employee had not given any indication that he would be
leaving early until questioned by the employer. Finding no lack of accom-
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The employee must exert efforts to reach an accommodation; where
the employer cannot make a reasonable accommodation without
undue hardship, the burden shifts to the employee."8
B. Undue Hardship
Determination of a "reasonable accommodation" involves a bal-
ancing between ease of accommodation and undue hardship. The
court in Claybaugh stated: "As the degree of business hardship
increases, the quantity of conduct which will satisfy the reasonable
accommodation requirement, decreases."79 According to the EEOC
guidelines, "[sluch undue hardship, for example, may exist where
the employee's needed work cannot be performed by another em-
ployee of substantially similar qualifications during the period of
absence of the Sabbath observer." 0
The EEOC has determined that where a job requires specialized
skills, an attempt to accommodate may cause undue hardship to the
employer.8" Practical time elements of the job may also be held to
impose an undue hardship upon the employer, thereby relieving
him of having to make accommodations to his employee's religious
practices."2 The size of the employer's operation will also affect the
modation by the employer, the EEOC stressed that the employer "had no
available pool of qualified employees, on such short notice, from which a
relief employee could be obtained . . . ... Id. at 4656.
78. Fischer v. Alsing, 7 F.E.P. Cas. 220, 221 (D. Ore. 1974). In Fischer,
the necessity of having the job supervised made it impossible for the em-
ployer to accommodate the employee's religious needs. Id. at 222. The
court found that the employee "did not make a reasonable effort to relocate
his family's residence" closer to his job and therefore could not claim that
the termination of his employment violated the Civil Rights Act. Id.
79. 355 F. Supp. at 6.
80. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1974).
81. EEOC Dec. No. 70773, 2 F.E.P. Cas. 686 (May 7,1970). In that case
the Sabbath observer applied for a job as a process engineer. The position
required that he be available for work seven days a week. "Given the
specialized nature of the process engineer's knowledge and the continuous
call-in nature of his responsibilities, the Commission [concluded] 'that
accommodation of Charging Party's religious practices with the duties of
the job applied for would involve an 'undue hardship on the conduct of
Respondent's business' within the meaning of the Guidelines.'" Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
82. EEOC Dec. No. 70-99, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4096 (Aug. 27, 1969).
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degree of hardship."'
The burden of proving undue hardship is placed upon the, em-
ployer,84 and the EEOC requires specific evidence that he could not
accommodate without undue hardship.85 The employer is required
to document "its inability to find a substitute employee and the
economic effect of [the employee's] absence on its business."" The
employer cannot argue that accommodation will cause dissatisfac-
tion or inconvenience, as "inconvenience is not 'undue hardship.' "87
Thus, to sustain a finding of undue hardship there must be a show-
ing by the employer of a substantial burden upon the continued
operation of his business.
IV. Union Membership and Religious Discrimination
The power of a labor organization8 emanates from its size and the
A Sabbath observer was hired as an employee for the harvesting season.
The EEOC recognized that it was impossible for the employer to obtain
and train a substitute to work once a week for six weeks.
83. Shaffield v. Northrup Worldwide Aircraft Servs., 373 F. Supp. 937
(M.D. Ala. 1974). "Generally, the issue in cases of this nature is whether
the rearranging of the work schedule would cause undue hardship. Of
course, in very small offices and enterprises . . . the shifting of one em-
ployee to another shift may cause very real hardship to an employer." Id.
at 941 (citations omitted). In a recent case where the plaintiff was em-
ployed by a post office with eight employees, the court found that the
defendant "simply did not have the manpower to accommodate plaintiff's
request." Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 364 F. Supp. 37, 42 (N.D.
Fla. 1973).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(c) (1974).
85. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
86. EEOC Dec. No. 72-1578, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4652, 4653 (Apr.
21, 1972).
87. Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ark.
1972).
88. "Labor organization" is defined in the National Labor Relations
Act as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee represen-
tation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970). The Civil Rights Act con-
tains a similar definition. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended,
(Supp. II, 1972).
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control it exerts over its membership. The most effective means of
maintaining and increasing such power is through a union shop
agreement.89 Where an individual's religious convictions prevent
him from joining any type of labor organization there is a potential
conflict between first amendment rights and labor laws.
Union interest in total employee membership has been recognized
by Congress in the union shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act9"
and the National Labor Relations Act." Prior to the 1972 amend-
ment to the Civil Rights Act, courts consistently held that when a
union shop agreement is in force an individual must be discharged
if he refuses to join the union; this termination is without regard to
the individual's religious convictions and first amendment protec-
tions, since courts readily find compelling state interests in sustain-
ing labor unions. 2 As one court stated:
We conclude that in weighing the burden which falls upon the plaintiff if she
would avoid offending her religious convictions, as against the affront which
sustaining her position would offer to the congressionally supported principle
of the union shop, it is plaintiff who must suffer."
89. A union shop agreement has been defined as an agreement between
the employer and a union which provides that a new employee must join
the union within a specified time as a condition of employment. Failure
to continue as a member in good standing requires termination of employ-
ment by the employer. See 2 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 4.9(2) (1969). The
National Labor Relations Act provides for union shop agreements:
"[N]othing . . . shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning
of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is
later. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
90. Railway Labor Act § 2(11), 45 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970) provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other
statute or law of the United States . . . or of any State, any carrier ...
and a labor organization. . . shall be permitted-(a) to make agreements,
requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days
following the beginning of such employment . . . all employees shall be-
come members of the labor organization representing their craft or class
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970); see note 88 supra.
92. See Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956);
Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953).
93. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1971).
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Two recent cases have, however, specifically extended the re-
quirements of the 1972 amendment to union membership cases. 4
The EEOC held that the discharge of a Seventh-Day Adventist who
refused to pay union dues because of his religious convictions consti-
tuted unlawful religious discrimination.95 The EEOC recognized
that the facts of the case were "virtually identical" to the first
amendment cases 6 which had consistently found that the employer
was required to fire the religious observer. Nevertheless, the EEOC
refused to apply these principles to the Title VII case. Instead the
EEOC imposed upon the employer a requirement to attempt a rea-
sonable accommodation before any termination, regardless of the
requirements of the union shop agreement. While it noted that there
was a conflict between Title VII and the National Labor Relations
Act, it refused to resolve it until such an attempt at reasonable
accommodation was made.9
The Ninth Circuit, in Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp.,98
has affirmed the EEOC view. The court held that the 1972 amend-
ment requires the employer to show he cannot reasonably accommo-
date the employee without undue hardship, before the worker can
be fired.9 It remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether or not it was possible for the employer to make such a
reasonable accommodation, noting that in a union membership case
it may be impossible to do so.'"
The decision did not indicate the approach the district court
might follow. The thrust of the court of appeals' decision indicates,
however, that if an employee refuses to pay any union dues and the
94. Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir.
1974); EEOC Dec. No. 74-107, 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Guide 4149 (Apr. 2,
1974). But cf. EEOC Dec. No. 71-1784, summarized at 6 EEOC ANN. REP.
17 (1972); Edwards & Kaplan 599 nn.142, 144.
95. EEOC Dec. No. 74-107, 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Guide 4149 (Apr. 2,
1974).
96. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Otten v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953).
97. EEOC Dec. No. 74-107, 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Guide 4149, 4150-51
(Apr. 2, 1974).
98. 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
99. Id. at 403.
100. Id. at 403-05.
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union insists on enforcement of the union shop clause, the employee
may be fired:
Since we hold that if a reasonable accommodation can be reached between
the parties it must be offered appellant Yott and such determination is for
the District Court on remand ... we leave analysis of whether the 'business
necessity' test would be met for the District Court's determination. We are
certain that the court will keep in mind that the purpose of a union security
clause is to insure that all who receive the benefits of the collective bargaining
agreement pay their fair share.'0 '
Neither Yott nor the EEOC decision specifically delineates what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation or an undue hardship in a
union membership case. Recognition of the importance of a union
shop has been demonstrated in first amendment cases.'0 But unlike
Sabbath cases in which an employee's work schedule can often be
easily changed, the repercussions in the union of allowing a free
rider would certainly be considerable.'03 Although Title VII may
require the employer to make some effort to save the employee's job,
it would appear that the Act has not affected the right of the union
-to insist on enforcement of the union shop clause.
V. Conclusion
One purpose of the 1972 amendment was to clarify what consti-
tuted unlawful discrimination on the basis of religion. The amend-
ment incorporated the Seeger-Welsh definition of religion, encom-
passing religious practices, observances, and beliefs into the statu-
tory framework of the Civil Rights Act. Although the 1972 amend-
ment did not place the burden of proving the sincerity of the reli-
gious conviction with either party, the EEOC and the courts should
place it solely with the person claiming it-the employee. The 1972
amendment requires an employer to attempt a reasonable accom-
modation of an employee's religious needs unless he can show undue
hardship on his business. The terms "reasonable accommodation"
and "undue hardship" are both relative concepts. While neither the
EEOC nor the courts have attempted to fashion rules applicable to
every conceivable factual situation, some basic guidelines for rea-
101. Id. at 402 n.6.
102. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Otten
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953).
103. 501 F.2d at 402 n.6.
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sonable accommodation have developed. Where the accommoda-
tion is made difficult, the degree of hardship to be shown which
would relieve the employer of his duty to accommodate is lessened.
Prior to the 1972 amendment, litigation in union membership
cases was primarily concerned with first amendment issues. Recent
cases, however, have sought to apply the reasonable accommodation
mandate of the 1972 amendment in the union membership area.
These cases direct an employer to attempt a reasonable accommo-
dation before discharging the employee. It would appear, however,
that whether a case is brought under first amendment grounds or
under the Act the result will be the same: the employee who, be-
cause of his religious beliefs, refuses to join the union (i.e., pay dues)
may be fired when a union shop agreement is in effect. Nevertheless,
Title VII and the labor laws might be harmonized by requiring the
employer to find the discharged employee another job in a segment
of the employer's business not covered by a union shop agreement,
if this can be done without undue hardship. Thus, the 1972 amend-
ment will have little effect on the ability of the union to enforce a
union shop contract.
John D. Dadakis
Thomas M. Russo
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